CVE-2026-127031

In Eclipse AAS4J before 3.0.1, `XmlSchemaValidator.validateSchema()` (and `AASXValidator.validateSchema()`, which calls it) validates untrusted XML with a default JAXP `Validator` that resolves external DTDs and external entities. An attacker who supplies a crafted AAS XML document or AASX package can read local files from the host, send their contents out-of-band to an attacker-controlled server, and make the validating process send arbitrary outbound requests (SSRF). Validation still returns no errors.

Details:

- Vulnerable code: `dataformat-xml/src/main/java/org/eclipse/digitaltwin/aas4j/v3/dataformat/xml/XmlSchemaValidator.java`. `schema.newValidator().validate(new StreamSource(...))` runs without `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD` / `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA` restrictions and without `disallow-doctype-decl`.

- Second entry point: `dataformat-aasx/src/main/java/org/eclipse/digitaltwin/aas4j/v3/dataformat/aasx/AASXValidator.java`. The AAS XML part of an `.aasx` package is passed unchanged to the vulnerable validator.

- `XmlDeserializer` (Jackson/Woodstox) is not affected, because DTD support is disabled by default there.

- Present since the initial import of the code base (commit `cc9da52`).

- Fix: harden the validator by setting `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD` and `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA` to `""` and rejecting `DOCTYPE` declarations. The bundled `AAS.xsd` does not need DTDs, so no functionality is lost.