Description
Tor 0.2.0.28, and probably 0.2.0.34 and earlier, allows remote attackers, with control of an entry router and an exit router, to confirm that a sender and receiver are communicating via vectors involving (1) replaying, (2) modifying, (3) inserting, or (4) deleting a single cell, and then observing cell recognition errors at the exit router. NOTE: the vendor disputes the significance of this issue, noting that the product's design "accepted end-to-end correlation as an attack that is too expensive to solve."
Metrics
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:PAffected software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | n/a |
References
- http://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
- http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-dc-09/bh-dc-09-archives.html#Fu
- http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Fu/BlackHat-DC-09-Fu-Break-Tors-Anonymity.pdfExploit
- http://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
- http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-dc-09/bh-dc-09-archives.html#Fu
- http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-09/Fu/BlackHat-DC-09-Fu-Break-Tors-Anonymity.pdfExploit
Timeline
- Published
- Feb 20, 2009
- Last modified
- Jun 16, 2026
- NVD status
- Modified