Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: zero ff_effect before compat copy in input_ff_effect_from_user
In the compat path input_ff_effect_from_user() aliases the caller's native struct ff_effect with the smaller struct ff_effect_compat and copies only the compat sized prefix:
compat_effect = (struct ff_effect_compat *)effect;
if (copy_from_user(compat_effect, buffer, sizeof(struct ff_effect_compat)))
The tail of the native structure is never written. Callers pass an uninitialized on-stack object, for example evdev_do_ioctl() for EVIOCSFF, so those bytes keep their previous stack contents. input_ff_upload() then stores the full native structure in ff->effects[id], from where a uinput based force feedback daemon can read it back via UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD, disclosing kernel stack memory to userspace.
Zero the effect before the compat copy.
Metrics
No CVSS score has been published yet.
Affected software
Source: the vendor's advisory (CNA). NVD analysis pending.
No affected versions have been published.
Timeline
- Published
- Oct 6, 2026
- Last modified
- Oct 19, 2026
- NVD status
- Received