Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write on Type II inbound URBs
data_ep_set_params() sizes each URB transfer buffer before it adds the Format Type II transfer delimiter:
u->packets = urb_packs; u->buffer_size = maxsize * u->packets;
if (fmt->fmt_type == UAC_FORMAT_TYPE_II) u->packets++; /* for transfer delimiter */ u->urb = usb_alloc_urb(u->packets, GFP_KERNEL);
buffer_size is computed from the pre-increment packet count and never recomputed, so for a Type II endpoint the buffer is one packet short of the packet count the URB is built with.
prepare_inbound_urb() then lays out one iso frame per packet and never consults buffer_size:
offs = 0; for (i = 0; i < urb_ctx->packets; i++) { urb->iso_frame_desc[i].offset = offs; urb->iso_frame_desc[i].length = ep->curpacksize; offs += ep->curpacksize; }
urb->transfer_buffer_length = offs; urb->number_of_packets = urb_ctx->packets;
The last descriptor therefore points one packet past the end of the transfer buffer, where the host controller writes device data on every inbound transfer. prepare_silent_urb() and prepare_playback_urb() bound their fill loops by ctx->buffer_size, so only capture is affected.
fmt_type comes from the device's audio streaming descriptors, so any device advertising a Type II capture format hits this once userspace sets hw_params on the stream.
KASAN on 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64) with a dummy_hcd/raw-gadget device, one report per inbound transfer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer Write of size 64 at addr ffff0000186171c0 by task cons02/166 __asan_memcpy dummy_timer hrtimer_run_softirq Allocated by task 166: usb_alloc_coherent snd_usb_endpoint_set_params The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 64-byte region [ffff000018617180, ffff0000186171c0)
Compute buffer_size after the delimiter packet has been accounted for, and bound the fill loop by buffer_size, as prepare_silent_urb() already does on the outbound side. This grows every Type II URB allocation by one maxsize packet.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Metrics
No CVSS score has been published yet.
Affected software
Source: the vendor's advisory (CNA). NVD analysis pending.
No affected versions have been published.
Timeline
- Published
- Aug 22, 2026
- Last modified
- Oct 14, 2026
- NVD status
- Received