Description
In TLSX_EchChangeSNI, the ctx->extensions branch set extensions unconditionally even when TLSX_Find returned NULL. This caused TLSX_UseSNI to attach the attacker-controlled publicName to the shared WOLFSSL_CTX when no inner SNI was configured. TLSX_EchRestoreSNI then failed to clean it up because its removal was gated on serverNameX != NULL. The inner ClientHello was sized before the pollution but written after it, causing TLSX_SNI_Write to memcpy 255 bytes past the allocation boundary.
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HWeakness enumeration
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL | wolfSSL | <= 5.9.0 |
References
- https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10102Issue Tracking
Timeline
- Published
- Apr 9, 2026
- Last modified
- Jun 17, 2026
- NVD status
- Analyzed