Description
A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HWeakness enumeration
Affected software
Source: the vendor's advisory (CNA). NVD analysis pending.
No affected versions have been published.
Timeline
- Published
- Aug 12, 2026
- Last modified
- Oct 23, 2026
- NVD status
- Awaiting Analysis