Description
An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HWeakness enumeration
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | n/a |
References
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.htmlExploit, Third Party Advisory, VDB Entry
- https://Nokia.comProduct
- https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/Vendor Advisory
- http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.htmlExploit, Third Party Advisory, VDB Entry
- https://Nokia.comProduct
- https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/Vendor Advisory
Timeline
- Published
- Jun 16, 2023
- Last modified
- Jun 17, 2026
- NVD status
- Modified