Description
The path in this case is a little bit convoluted. The end result is that via an ioctl an untrusted app can control the ui32PageIndex offset in the expression:sPA.uiAddr = page_to_phys(psOSPageArrayData->pagearray[ui32PageIndex]);With the current PoC this crashes as an OOB read. However, given that the OOB read value is ending up as the address field of a struct I think i seems plausible that this could lead to an OOB write if the attacker is able to cause the OOB read to pull an interesting kernel address. Regardless if this is a read or write, it is a High severity issue in the kernel.Product: AndroidVersions: Android SoCAndroid ID: A-238904312
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HWeakness enumeration
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| n/a | Android | Android SoC |
References
- https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-09-01Vendor Advisory
- https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2022-09-01Vendor Advisory
Timeline
- Published
- Sep 13, 2022
- Last modified
- Jun 17, 2026
- NVD status
- Modified