Description
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NWeakness enumeration
Affected software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | n/a |
References
- http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.htmlVendor Advisory
- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdfExploit, Third Party Advisory
- http://software-dl.ti.com/simplelink/esd/simplelink_cc13x2_26x2_sdk/3.20.00.68/exports/changelog.htmlVendor Advisory
- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-zhang-yue.pdfExploit, Third Party Advisory
Timeline
- Published
- Sep 20, 2021
- Last modified
- Jun 17, 2026
- NVD status
- Modified